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Power of Attorney as a Protective Device for
Foreign Owned United States Assets
E. Thomas Watson*
I. Introduction: The Need for Protective Devices
The high degree of protection given to private property throughout
United States history has attracted foreign investments to our country
since World War II. For many foreign investors, however, the evident
political stability of the United States and our tradition of protecting
private ownership of property has not been enough to ease their fears
that their United States holdings might be blocked, confiscated or other-
wise interfered with by the United States or a foreign government. The
source of such action could be their own country, a third country
through which they hold their United States investments (e.g., a tax ha-
ven country) or even the United States. These investors' fears have been
intensified by such events as the freezing of the assets of the ex-Shah of
Iran and his family in the United States,' the earlier freezing of the revo-
lutionary Iranian government's assets by the United States 2 and by up-
heavals and near-upheavals elsewhere in the world. Accordingly,
lawyers, trust companies and other advisors worldwide are promoting a
variety of schemes, often involving trusts organized in tax havens, to pro-
tect foreign investments in the United States against expropriation or
blocking by either the investor's home government or that of the United
States.3 Elaborate escape provisions then seek to protect the entity from
attempted expropriations by the government of the tax haven itself.
This article questions the efficacy of this approach. An examination
of cases arising under the Trading with the Enemy Act 4 ("TWEA") dem-
onstrates that the power and willingness of United States courts to look
through a variety of cloaking devices is virtually unlimited. Anticipating
the worst, as one must, even to consider the need for these "doomsday
* B.A. 1973, Yale University; J.D. 1976, University of North Carolina; Associate, Parker,
Poe, Thompson, Bernstein, Gage & Preston, Charlotte, North Carolina.
I See Exec. Order No. 12,284, 3 C.F.R. 115 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 at 870
(Supp. V 1981).
2 See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 at 864
(Supp. V 1981).
3 See, e.g., Knight, Failsafe Legal Structures to Protect U.S. Assets of Foreign Investors Against
Political Emergencies, INVESTMENT U.S.A., Special Supp. Aug. 1983, at 1.
4 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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trusts," it must be presumed that a foreign government intent on seizing
its nationals' property would be equally vigorous in piercing the veil of
sanctuary trusts and corporations. In that event, the final, deciding chal-
lenge to the ownership of assets situated in the United States would have
to be made and defended in United States courts, and not in the courts
of the country where the trust was organized. Thus, regardless of the
domicile of the holding entity, United States law and public policy will
always apply.
5
In addition, the elaborate devices advocated by some writers6 for
changing the domicile of tax haven trusts, or for "decanting" their assets
into still other trusts, demonstrate that the selection of a holding entity in
a third country increases the number of governments with the possible
ability to interfere with the original owner's rights of ownership. If these
provisions are ever triggered, the owner of the trust may face the addi-
tional problem of serious United States tax consequences. 7 Thus, al-
though other factors such as tax advantages and bank secrecy laws may
well justify the use of a tax haven trust or holding company, a decision to
establish such an entity should not be made for reasons of political secur-
ity. Any ultimate political security advantage is likely to be outweighed
by the more immediate problems of impaired flexibility of ownership
and control, and reduced ability to gain immigrant or nonimmigrant
status to enter the United States.
As an alternative to the complexities of third country trusts, particu-
larly now that their tax advantages appear to be declining, 8 this article
proposes the use of a broadly-drafted state power of attorney, to be held
(but filed only if needed) by the investor's United States attorney. This
device has worked in past revolutionary confiscations, 9 is infinitely
adaptable to changing circumstances, and does not commit the investor
to a cumbersome alternative to direct ownership of his investments. If
needed, the power of attorney can be drafted and executed in conjunc-
tion with a Jnited States will and/or stand-by trust. In at least one
situation - an interference with communications caused by war or natu-
5 Faced with the problem of determining the proper situs of stock in a Canadian invest-
ment company held by a New York bank in a custodian account for the benefit of the King of
Iraq, the Second Circuit declined to explore the theoretical subtleties of the problem and in-
stead recognized the practical reality of that and all other situations involving United States
assets. "Only a court in the United States could compel the bank to pay the balance in the
account or to deliver the certificates it held in custody. The property here at issue thus was in
the United States." Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 1027 (1966).
6 See Knight, supra note 3.
7 See, e.g., Klein, Tax Aspects of Protective Devices Against Expropriation, 30 TAX Lmv. 369
(1977); Knight, supra note 3.
8 See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 92-248, § 342, 96
Stat. 324, 635 (not codified).
9 See Fred S. James & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co. of Am., 247 N.Y. 262, 160 N.E. 364 (1928)




ral catastrophe - it is superior to other protective devices. Most impor-
tantly, it has the appealing advantage of utter simplicity.
A protective device for the United States might be needed in the
following three basic situations and their several variants. First, invasion
or revolution in a foreign country could bring into power a new govern-
ment which attempts to confiscate the foreign assets of its nationals. This
could occur in the investor's home country or it could occur in a tax
haven state where the investor has already organized a holding entity,
perhaps to avoid the effects of revolution in his home country. Second,
these same political events could also trigger confiscation or a freeze of
assets by the United States government. Third, war, civil insurrection,
private kidnapping or natural calamities may make it impossible for the
alien to communicate instructions which are necessary to safeguard and
increase the value of his United States investments.
II. Confiscation by a Foreign Government
Regardless of whether the domestic law of the displaced regime
sanctioned expropriations or not, international and United States domes-
tic law1 0 fully recognize the right of a sovereign state to expropriate,
without compensation,II all forms of private property within its borders,
whether belonging to aliens or to nationals of that state. 2
In the United States, the legitimacy of the confiscation is upheld in
practice by the "act of state doctrine," a judge-created rule which is
firmly entrenched in the federal common law, 13 whereby courts refrain
from inquiring into the legality of the confiscation.1 4 While the existence
of the act of state doctrine is well settled, the extent of its reach is not. 15
Until recently, a fundamental limitation of the doctrine was that it had
10 On international law, see generally Seidi-Hohenvelden, Extraterritorial AEfects of Confircations
and Expropriations, 49 MICH. L. REV. 851 (1951); Note, Expropriations in International Law, 48
IOWA L. REV. 878 (1963). On U.S. law,seegenerally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964).
I I For convenience, "expropriation" will be used to refer to any governmental taking of
private property, and "confiscation" will be used to refer to an expropriation without
compensation.
12 "[Cionfiscations by a state of the property of its own nationals, no matter how flagrant
and regardless of whether compensation has been provided, do not constitute violations of inter-
national law." F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
afd per curim, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967). International law
requires that a taking of the property of aliens must be fully and effectively compensated. See
Nationalization and Internatinal Law.- Testimony of Elihu Lauterpacht, Q. C., 17 INT'L LAw. 97 (1983);
Note, supra note 10. But see G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 30) at 3, U.N. Doc.
No. A/9030 (1973) (full and effective compensation not required in some circumstances).
13 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
14 See Williams, The Act of State Doctrine: Alred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Repubhc of Cuba, 9
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 736 (1976).
15 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (plurality
opinion, with 2 concurrers and 4 dissenters); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U.S. 759 (1972) (plurality opinion, with 2 separate concurrers and 4 dissenters). See generally
Williams, supra note 14, at 742 & n.47.
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no effect on attempted expropriations of property located outside the ter-
ritory of the expropriating state. 16 This limitation of the territorial effect
of the act of state doctrine has enabled many foreigners to retain their
United States assets despite decrees of expropriation by their home coun-
try's government. 17 For many aliens, the knowledge of these past suc-
cesses constitutes all the protection they want for their United States
property.
The territorial limitation, however, is not absolute. Courts have rec-
ognized a few exceptions to its scope,' 8 and several commentators have
criticized its limiting effect on the confiscatory reach of supposedly de-
serving Third World governments. 19 In fact, perceived weaknesses in the
protection offered by the doctrine lie behind many of the commercial
trust schemes now being advocated.2 0 A critical question, then, for the
lawyer advising foreign investors on the safety of their United States as-
sets is what is the viablity of the act of state doctrine and its territorial
limitation.
The most recent "classic" statement of the act of state doctrine and
the territorial limitation was made by Judge Friendly in Repubh'c ofIraq v.
First National City Bank.2 ' King Faisal II of Iraq opened a bank account
and deposited various sums with the defendant bank at its offices in New
York. He also opened a custodian account in the same offices and depos-
ited stock certificates to a Canadian investment trust therein. Following
a military coup in which the King was overthrown and killed, the new
revolutionary government issued an ordinance purporting to confiscate
all of the King's assets and property interests, wherever found. Iraq then
took the relatively rare step of searching out the foreign assets and laying
claim to those found in the United States.22
The Second Circuit held that the confiscation ordinance was an act
of state that an American court was required to respect. Therefore, it
refused to inquire whether the ordinance was proper under Iraqi or inter-
national law. The court noted, however, that a United States court need
not enforce a foreign act of state to the extent that it attempted to affect
16 Seee.g. ,Sabbatzno, 376 U.S. at 413-14; Underhill, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Brush, 256 F. Supp.
at 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
17 See,e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970); Plesch
v. Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti, 273 A.D. 224, 77 N.Y.S.2d 43, afdper curiam,
298 N.Y. 573, 81 N.E.2d 106 (1948); Bollack v. Societe Generale pour Favoriser le Developpe-
ment du Commerce et de l'Industrie en France, 263 A.D. 601, 33 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1942), afdper
curam, 293 N.Y. 652, 56 N.E.2d 253 (1944).
18 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), discussed infra at notes 32-34 and accom-
panying text; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank of N.Y., 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981),
discussed infa at note 48; Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43
N.E.2d 502 (1942), discussed infra at 48 and accompanying text.
19 See Crockett, Extraterriortal Expropriations, 13 IND. L. REV. 655, 674 (1980); Note, supra
note 10.
20 See Knight, supra note 3.
21 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. dented, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
22 Id. at 49-50.
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title to property located in the United States, if the act of state was in-
compatible with United States public policy.23
The court held that the intangible property was "located" in the
United States. It also held that confiscations were, in almost all cases,
contrary to public policy and therefore, not enforceable within the
United States. According to the court, confiscations of corporate and per-
sonal property are "shocking" to the American sense of justice, and even
though the Fifth Amendment is not binding on other nations, it is indica-
tive of American public policy regarding confiscations. 24 The court sum-
marized: "Foreigners entrusting their property to custodians in this
country are entitled to expect this historic policy to be followed save
when the weightiest reasons call for a departure. . . .The policy of the
United States is that there is no such thing as a 'good' confiscation by
legislative or executive decree."' 25 Therefore, the court refused to honor
Iraq's claim to the King's United States assets.
The act of state doctrine and the territorial limitation as stated in
Republic of Iraq have been applied with equal stringency to assets owned
by foreigners and to assets owned by American citizens. 26 The doctrine
has been applied to assets owned by foreign corporations as well, 27 de-
spite the theoretical problems caused when a foreign government confis-
cates the assets of a corporation organized under the laws of the foreign
state, thus dissolving the corporation in the state in which it was incorpo-
rated. 28 Other thorny theoretical problems are created when a foreign
state leaves the corporate form intact and confiscates only the corpora-
tion's shares in the hands of its resident shareholders. 29 In both in-
stances, American courts have ignored theory to protect assets situated in
the United States from confiscation.3 0 This willingness to overlook the-
23 Id. at 51.
24 Id at 52.
25 Id AccordPlesch, 273 A.D. 224, -, 77 N.Y.S.2d 43, 49 (1948) ("Confiscation in ostensi-
ble compliance with foreign edicts which are void in this State, has sometimes been compared,
in its legal effect, to action by thieves or marauders").
26 See Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1981); Plesch, 273 A.D.
224, 77 N.Y.S.2d 43.
27 The Republic ofIraq language specifically embraced both corporations and individuals.
See Republic of Iraq, 353 F.2d at 51. In United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937), the
Court suggested in dicta that the property of a corporation might not be as deserving of protec-
tion as the property of individuals, but this proposition has yet to be adopted by any court.
28 See Mann, The Confiscation of Corporatons, Corporate Rights, and Corporate Assets and the Con-
fjict ofLaws, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 471 (1962). See also Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 313 (1982) (decree expropriating all
plaintiff Vietnamese corporation's Vietnam assets held neither to dissolve the plaintiff corpora-
tion nor to expropriate the plaintiff's U.S. assets).
29 See Seidl-Hohenvelden, supra note 10, at 857; Mann, supra note 28.
30 Where possible, U.S. courts will hold that an intangible asset has a U.S. situs. See Vi-
shtpco, 654 F.2d at 862; Carl Zeiss Stiflung, 433 F.2d at 699 (2d Cir. 1970); Repubhc ofIraq, 353
F.2d at 51; Brush, 256 F. Supp. at 492 n. 12. Cf State of the Netherlands v. Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y., 201 F.2d 455, 463 (2d Cir. 1953); FredS.James & Co., 247 N.Y. at 269-70, 160 N.E. at 366-
67.
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ory in favor of asset protection is another indication of the general repug-
nance that American courts feel for foreign nationalizations.
The court in Republic of Iraq noted that the United States Supreme
Court appeared to violate the policy against "good" confiscations in
United States v. Belmont 3 ' and again in United States o. Pink .32 These cases
involved the so-called Litvinov Assignment. 33 As a result of its wholesale
confiscations following the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Government
asserted numerous claims against assets of former Russian corporations
and individuals located in the United States. Many persons in the
United States likewise had claims against the Soviet Government, which
was not recognized by the United States for several years folowing the
Revolution. As a part of the overall negotiations and arrangements
which concluded in the recognition of the Soviet Government on No-
vember 16, 1933, the United States agreed, by exchange of diplomatic
notes with the Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov, to accept the assign-
ment by the Soviet Government of all of its claims against assets located
in the United States. The United States then pursued those assets and
held them to satisfy the claims of Americans against the Soviet Union. 34
This procedure placed the United States in the unlikely position of debt
collector for the Soviet Union.
In Belmont, the United States sued in probate to recover a sum of
money deposited with a private banker in New York prior to 1918 by a
Russian corporation which was later dissolved by Soviet decree. 35 In
Pink, the United States sued the New York Superintendent of Insurance
to recover the assets of the New York branch of a Russian insurance
company which remained after the Superintendent had wound up the
corporation and paid its creditors. 36 In both cases, the Supreme Court
upheld the assignment and the United States' prevailing interest in the
property. The Belmont Court in particular used sweeping language to
justify its holding. "[E]very sovereign state must recognize the indepen-
dence of every other sovereign state; and . . . the courts of one will not
sit in judgment upon the acts of the government of another, done within
its own territory. ' 37 This, of course, is the act of state doctrine. The
Court, however, went on to hold that the public policy of the United
States was not offended by the taking, seemingly because "what another
country has done in the way of taking over property of its national, and
especially of its corporations, is not a matter for judicial consideration
here."'38 Some commentators suggested that this language overruled the
31 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
32 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
33 Litvinov Agreement, Nov. 16, 1933, United States-Soviet Union, II Bevans 1248, 1256-
57.
34 Id. at 1256-57. See also Belmont, 301 U.S. at 326-27.
35 Belmont, 301 U.S. at 326-27.
36 Pink, 315 U.S. at 210-14.
37 Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327.
38 Id. at 332.
[VOL. 9
FOREIGN OWNED ASSETS
territorial limitation of the act of state doctrine as it applied to foreign
governments recognized by the United States.39
Subsequent decisions have found alternative and somewhat more
reassuring grounds for the Belmont holding. United States public policy
was not offended by the enforcement of the Soviet confiscations in the
United States because our government endorsed them by accepting the
Litvinov Assignment. It was this foreign policy decision by the Executive
which overcame the traditional hostility of the United States towards
confiscations.
40
Foreign policy has cleansed other government takings of the taint of
confiscation and allowed them to be enforced in the United States. Im-
mediately after the invasion of The Netherlands by the Germans in
World War II, the Dutch government-in-exile issued Royal Decree Al
which purported to place title to all intangible property belonging to
Dutch citizens resident in the occupied territory in the name of the state,
which was represented by the government-in-exile. The decree stated
that the taking was solely for the purpose of conserving the assets and
that they would be returned to the owners after the war.4 I The United
States courts upheld these takings against persons who acquired securi-
ties in violation of the decree from the Germans. These were "good" con-
fiscations, fully supported by United States foreign policy and not
intended to be permanent. 42
With these two exceptions, the territorial limitation to the act of
state doctrine had seemed as fundamental as the doctrine itself and as
unlikely to change. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatno ,43 however, the
United States Supreme Court found "constitutional underpinnings" for
the doctrine but not for the limitation, and thus seemed to prepare the
way for a future court to hold that the territorial limitation was not an
absolute bar to the foreign state's confiscation. 44 Two subsequent
Supreme Court cases have only strengthened the doctrinal confusion ex-
pressed by Sabbatino.45 Neither of these decisions commanded a majority
and the multiple opinions accommodate almost every possible viewpoint.
Despite the intellectual disarray of the opinions, however, the results
squarely support the territorial limitation.
Other indications support the conclusion that the territorial limita-
tion is still valid. The Second Circuit's formulation of the doctrine in
39 See Seidi-Hohenvelden, supra note 10, at 854. See also United States v. N.Y. Trust Co.,
75 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
40 See Sabbalino, 376 U.S. at 414; Republic of Iraq, 353 F.2d at 52; Bollack, 263 A.D. at , 33
N.Y.S.2d at 988; Seidl-Hohenvelden, supra note 10, at 854.
41 See, e.g., Anderson, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942).
42 Id.; State of the Netherlands, 201 F.2d at 460-61.
43 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
44 Id. at 423. At least one commentator has argued that Sabbatino implicitly rejected the
territorial limitation. See Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts.- Sabbalino, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964).
4- See Dunhill, 425 U.S. 682; First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. 759.
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Republic of Iraq was cited with apparent approval by the Supreme Court
in its last case, Alred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Repubhc of Cuba. 46 More-
over, the Court's musings regarding the constitutional underpinnings of
the doctrine appear to have given way to an explanation founded in ju-
dicial restraint and a desire not to embarrass the Executive in its practice
of foreign policy.47 Thus, the territorial limitation seems once again to be
as firmly established as the act of state doctrine itself. Lower courts
48
and commentators 49 still adhere to the territorial limitation in its pure
form.
III. Freezing or Vesting by the United States Government
Foreign investors have more to fear than the actions of their govern-
ments. The same invasion or revolution which brings a confiscation-
minded government to power in a foreign country may also trigger war
or less violent hostilities between that country and the United States.
The United States Executive possesses broad powers to freeze or "vest"
assets owned by foreigners in the United States in the event of declared
war or proclaimed national emergency.
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA")5 0
allows the President, under circumstances defined by the National Emer-
gencies Act, 5 1 to freeze (the word "block" is also used) foreign assets in
the United States. The President may regulate or prohibit foreign ex-
change transactions, the use of the banks by foreign countries or nation-
als and the holding, use, transfer or exercise of any power with respect to
''any property in which any foreign country or national thereof has any
interest." '52 In addition, the President may require any person subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States to furnish complete information
under oath regarding property and transactions subject to the Act.5 3
46 Dunh'll, 425 U.S. at 687.
47 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423; Williams, supra note 14, at 736, 753-54, 761.
48 See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Sti?ung, 433 F.2d at 698; Republhc ofIraq, 353 F.2d 47; Brush, 256 F.
Supp. 481. But one panel of the Second Circuit has been over-eager to find that a Cuban
confiscation was not contrary to United States foreign or public policy. Banco Nactionalde Cuba,
658 F.2d at 908-09. The court based its remarkable holding that enforcement of a Cuban confis-
cation decree in the United States did not violate United States public policy on the fact that no
former owners of the confiscated banks had stepped forward in the United States in twenty
years of litigation. Id at 909. It is hoped that this decision will be limited to its facts.
49 See, e.g., Crockett, supra note 19; Kenney, Expropriations of Offshore Branches of American
Banks Located in Foreign Tax Havens, 14 INT'L LAW. 286 (1980); Williams, supra note 14; Com-
ment, Foreign Expropriation Cases in the United States: Con flicting Legislation andJudicial Policies, 17
U.S. FOREIGN L. REV. 117 (1982). The latter comment, however, notes strong resistance by the
courts to Congressional efforts to weaken the basic act of state doctrine, and the Crockett article
argues for upholding certain supposedly justified third world confiscations.
50 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. V 1981).
51 National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 8, 10 and 50 U.S.C.).
52 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
53 Id. § 1702(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
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There has been no reported test of whether this provision authorizes the
President to override the attorney-client privilege.
The language of the IEEPA is sweeping. During its short history it
has been applied with drastic results. When the American diplomatic
hostages were seized by Iran, President Carter used the Act to freeze all
"property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instru-
mentalities and controlled entities and The Central Bank of Iran which
are or became subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which
are or come within the possession or control of persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States."'54
Subsequent executive orders issued during the Iranian crisis imple-
mented the so-called Algiers Declarations 55 which freed the hostages by
(1) nullifying all existing and otherwise valid judicial attachments of Ira-
nian government property in the United States (by that time frozen by
the earlier executive order); (2) ordering the transfer of the foreign assets
to a special fund abroad; and (3) setting aside all judgments and termi-
nating all lawsuits against the government of Iran by American credi-
tors. 56 A related executive order froze the assets of the ex-Shah of Iran
and his family in the United States so as to permit the revolutionary
government to pursue its claims against those persons.5 7
These executive orders and the President's power to act under the
IEEPA were broadly upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
Dames and Moore v. Regan, a in which the Court stated: "We think both
the legislative history and the cases interpreting the TWEA [Trading
with the Enemy Act] fully sustain the broad authority of the Executive
when acting under this Congressional grant of power."' 59
Freezing orders permit the President to carry out his constitutional
foreign policy powers by permitting him to use foreign assets as a bar-
gaining chip in negotiations, the Court held, so their implementation is
virtually unlimited by the Constitution. 60 The case arose when a United
States company challenged the Executive's nullification of a judicial at-
tachment obtained by the company of certain Iranian assets located in
the United States. The assets had been made available for attachment
by the plaintiff when they were frozen by executive order. The freeze
which the plaintiff in Dames and Moore exploited was not challenged by
that plaintiff. Nonetheless, the decision impliedly upheld the freeze as
54 Exec. Order No. 12, 170,3 C.F.R. 457 (1979),reprinedi 50 U.S.C. § 1701 at 864 (Supp.
V 1981).
55 Algiers Declaration, Jan. 19, 1981, United States-Algeria-Iran, reprinted in 81 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 1 (Feb. 1981).
56 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 664-66 (1981). See also Exec. Orders Nos.
12.276-12.284, 3 C.F.R. 104-18 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 at 866-72 (Supp. V 1981).
-7 Exec. Order No. 12.284, 3 C.F.R. 115 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 at 870 (Supp.
V 1981).
58 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
59 Id. at 672.
60 Id. at 673-74.
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well as the subsequent transfer of the assets. The plaintiffs interest in its
attachments (which were only made possible by the earlier freeze) was
conditional and revocable, and as such, the President's transfer of the
assets subject to the attachment was not unconstitutional.
A lower court's decision has supplemented the Supreme Court's
opinion by holding that the President's decision to declare an emergency,
and thus invoke the IEEPA, is not subject to judicial review.61 The de-
spairing attorney for Dames and Moore surveyed the wreckage of his
client's position and proclaimed, "The power afforded the President
under Dames and Moore v. Regan is so sweeping there is little that Ameri-
can businesses can do to protect themselves .... "62
Foreign investors and their advisors should note that the IEEPA has
only been invoked against foreign governments and their agencies; it has
not yet been used against individuals (other than the ex-Shah). In addi-
tion, the United States government has allowed the frozen assets of indi-
viduals to be paid to their foreign owners once the alien leaves his
country and enters the United States. 63 Cubans affected by freeze orders
have generally been able to receive their assets under a special "refugee"
license upon emmigrating from Cuba, if they can provide appropriate
proof of their ownership of the assets.
A vesting order under section 5 of the TWEA is far more severe than
a freeze order. Under current law, it can only be issued by the govern-
ment during time of declared war. 64 Unlike freezing, vesting orders ap-
parently have not been issued with blanket coverage, but only with
reference to specific property. Once issued, the order transfers title to the
property specified in the order to the Alien Property Custodian, an office
of the United States government, which may then retain, use or sell the
asset for the benefit of the United States. 65 The power to vest extends in
theory to any property or interest in which any foreign country or na-
tional thereof (and not just the declared enemy) has any interest, in
whole or in part. Non-enemies, however, may sue to recover their prop-
erty after vesting so that, in effect, only "enemy-tainted" property may
be confiscated. 66
The procedures in the act are summary. A demand by the Alien
61 United States v. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 685 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1982).
62 Howard, Imphia/ions ofthe Iranian Assets Casefor Amerlcan Business, 16 INT'L LAW. 128, 138
(1982).
63 See Reeves, The Control ofForegn Funds by the United States Treasury, II LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 17, 38 (1945); Knight, supra note 3, at 12.
64 Prior to the enactment of the International Economic Emergency Powers Act and the
related amendment to the TWEA, the President could invoke section 5(b) "[djuring the time of
war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President." See 50 U.S.C.
app. § 5(b)(l) (1976) (repealed 1977). One appeals court found this section, together with a
Korean War declaration of national emergency, to be sufficient to uphold President Nixon's
unilateral imposition of a 10% surcharge on imports in August 1971. United States v. Yoshida
Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
65 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(l) (1976).
66 See Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A.G., 332 U.S. 480, 485 (1947).
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Property Custodian for possession of the property is tantamount to a tak-
ing. No defense may be raised to delay the Government's exercise of its
rights.6 7 Even after vesting, the only real issue is whether the property in
fact was enemy-tainted, 68 although a few courts have (improperly) in-
quired whether the property was being used to promote the enemy war
effort and whether the alien was truly an "enemy."'69 In a proceeding
brought after vesting to promptly recover on the grounds that the prop-
erty at issue is not enemy-tainted, the burden of proof is always on the
claimant, even if an American citizen. 70 In exercising his powers, the
Alien Property Custodian may replace the officers of a corporation, can-
cel issued and outstanding stock certificates and cause new certificates to
be issued. 71 Restraints imposed by state law on the alienation of ordi-
nary interests in property cannot defeat the Alien Property Custodian's
power to act. 72
Prior to 1941, the TWEA limited the President's power to the prop-
erty of enemy aliens, that is countries and nationals thereof with whom
the United States was at war. Before America's entry into the Second
World War, Germany was "notorious" for developing techniques to con-
ceal ownership or control of property ostensibly in friendly or neutral
hands and thus beyond the power of the Act. 73 Congress closed this ave-
nue of escape by amendment in 1941, in an effort to make vain every
attempt to avoid the TWEA by legal rearrangements of form.
Thus, under the 1941 amendment the nonenemy character of a foreign
corporation because it was organized in a friendly or neutral nation no
longer conclusively determines that all interests in the corporation must
be treated as friendly or neutral. The corporate veil can now be pierced.
Enemy taint can now be found [merely] if there are enemy officers or
stockholders; even if the presence of some non-enemy stockholders does
not prevent seizure of all the corporate assets. 74
The Executive's authority under the TWEA is extensive:
There is no doubt that under the war power [of the Constitution], as
heretofore interpreted by this Court, the United States, acting under a
statute, may vest in itself the property of a national of an enemy nation.
Unquestionably to wage war successfully, the United States may confis-
cate enemy property. Nor can there, we think, be any doubt that any
property in this country of any alien may be summarily reduced to pos-
67 See Bishopjudcial Construction of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 62 HARv. L. REV. 721,
726-29 (1949).
68 Kaufman v. Societe Generale pour Participation Industrielles et Comerciales, S.A., 343
U.S. 156, 159 (1952).
69 See, e.g., Josephberg v. Markham, 152 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1945); In re: Herter's Estate,
193 Misc. 602, 83 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sur. Ct. 1948), aft'd, 274 A.D. 979, 84 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1948). See
alro Bishop, supra note 67, at 740.
70 Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, 55 F. Supp. 906, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
71 Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 477 (1947).
72 Great N. Ry. v. Sutherland, 273 U.S. 182, 193-94 (1927); Miller v. Kaliwerke As-
cherleban Aktien-Gesellschatt, 283 F. 746, 751 (2d Cir. 1922). See also Bishop, supra note 67, at
738.
73 See Clark, 332 U.S. at 484.
74 Kaufman, 343 U.S. at 159.
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session by the United States in furtherance of the war effort . . . .The
problems of compensation may await judicial process. 75
Despite the amendment to the TWEA, during World War II a vari-
ety of cloaking devices were used in attempts to hide German or Japa-
nese participation in American enterprises. It is unknown how many
succeeded because they went undetected, but the record of the Alien
Property Custodian against those investments whose ownership was
traced is impressive. According to a senior attorney with the Alien Prop-
erty Custodian, devices such as trusts, unregistered or bearer shares, own-
ership by American citizens, control by recourse to' the personal or
business loyalty of the nominal owners or managers and controlling op-
tions were all discovered and successfully attacked.
76
A few examples from World War II emphasize the legal futility of
these devices. Certificates of stock in a Delaware corporation were regis-
tered in the name of a Swiss corporation which held them beneficially for
a German corporation, The share certficates were pledged to Swiss
banks to secure various loans and were deposited with those banks. The
Alien Property Custodian cancelled the certificates and had new ones
issued to it.
77
In June 1940, a German corporation sold its shares in an American
corporation to an American citizen for a nominal price. The American
corporation remained heavily indebted to its former owner. The Ameri-
can corporation was held to be owned by its creditor and former legal
owner.78
A Japanese citizen executed a power of attorney in favor of Hawai-
ian attorneys which authorized them to buy, sell, lease and mortgage
certain real property. The attorneys were also attorneys- in-fact for the
Japanese man's wife and son who was an American citizen. Purporting
to act pursuant to the power of attorney, the attorneys attempted to
transfer real property owned by the Japanese man to the son as a gift.
Thereafter, the rent received from the family's business located on the
property was paid to the son. The Alien Property Custodian successfully
avoided the transfer.
79
A Swiss corporation held stock in various American corporations.
The Swiss corporation's stock was owned by a naturalized citizen of
Liechtenstein, subject, however, to a "usufruct"' ' 0 in favor of his parents,
who were citizens of Germany. The court held that the son's acquired
citizenship was suspect, and that in any event, true ownership and con-
7-1 Silestan-Ameriran Corp., 332 U.S. at 475-76.
76 See Reeves, supra note 63.
77 Silestan-American Corp., 332 U.S. at 474-79.
78 Beck v. Clark, 88 F. Supp. 565, 567-68 (D. Conn. 1949).
79 Kaname Fujimo v. Clark, 88 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D. Hawaii 1947).
80 An "usufruct" is a German civil law property interest similar to a trust. See Lepaulle,
Civil Law Substitutesfor Trusts, 36 YALE LJ. 1126 (1927).
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trol remained with the German parents.8'
In each of these instances, the Alien Property Custodian's claim to
the assets was upheld by the courts.8 2 Where family relationships were
used to cloak beneficial ownership, the courts were particularly inclined
to disregard legal formalities. The Alien Property Custodian was author-
ized and encouraged to "look through and beyond the technicalities of
the law of conveyance to the realities. Family arrangements are subject
to close examination, and factual control is more significant than the
niceties of legal title."'8 3
IV. Trusts as Protective Devices
Both United States trusts and offshore trusts are often proposed as
solutions to the foregoing problems of home country confiscation and
United States freezes and vesting.8 4 When offshore trusts are used, elab-
orate provisions for "decanting" the trust assets or moving the domicile
of the trust to another jurisdiction are provided, in the event the offshore
jurisdiction, instead of the investor's home country, suffers the war or
revolution.8 5 Regardless of the trust's situs, the trust instrument must
contain intricate triggering mechanisms that either establish or fund the
trust in the first place, or, if already in existence, change the beneficiaries,
make the trust irrevocable or otherwise alter its peacetime nature to meet
the exigencies of the emergency. The actual suitability of these trusts
depends on the nature of the emergency.
A. Action by the United States
As previously noted, all persons, entities and property subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States are subject to the operation of the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act.86 Comprehensive reporting requirements en-
force this broad coverage.8 7 No device that leaves assets in the United
States, therefore, offers legal protection from the operation of this legisla-
tion. 8 The World War II experience suggests that only the discretion of
81 Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A.G. v. Brownell, 121 F. Supp. 420 (D.D.C. 1954).
82 See also Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921) (voting trust).
83 Kaname Fujimo, 71 F. Supp. at 4.
84 See Knight, supra note 3; Warren, Personal Trusts for Nonresideni Aliens, 121 TR. & EST. 36
(Apr. 1982); Klein, supra note 7.
85 See Knight, supra note 3, at 5, 9.
86 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976).
87 The President shall. . . require any person. . . to furnish under oath. . . com-
plete information relative to any act or transaction referred to in this subdivision
• . .or relative to any interest in foreign property, or relative to any property in
which any foreign country or any national thereof has or has had any interest
. . .and . . . the President may, in the manner hereinabove provided, require
the production, or if necessary to the national security or defense, the seizure, of
any books of account, records, contracts, letters, memoranda, or other papers, in
the custody or control of such person.
Id. § 5(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
88 Obviously, a foreign trust may offer certain practical obstacles to a government investi-
gation to determine the beneficial owners of the trust.
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the United States government in determining who really is an enemy
protects the foreign investor in time of war.89 Likewise, the executive
orders issued during, and at the conclusion of, the Iranian hostage crisis,
suggest that the government's power under the IEEPA is sufficient to
overcome any legal barriers to the operation of United States jurisdiction
over United States assets.
Against this background, both United States and offshore trusts
seem inferior. A United States trust is especially frail, since it offers mini-
mal practical obstacles to investigations by the government. A United
States trust lacks even the ancillary benefit of estate tax planning benefits
which a foreign trust, coupled with a foreign corporate holding com-
pany, offers.90 Although it may have other estate planning purposes, if
these are not sufficient in themselves to justify a United States trust, the
supposed political security benefits of such a trust should not alter this
analysis.
B. Action by a Foreign Government
The strongest United States legal defense against attempted foreign
confiscation of United States assets is the territorial limitation on the act
of state doctrine. Although it has been questioned, 91 it is difficult to find
a more firmly entrenched public policy than the one against arbitrary
confiscation of private property. The Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution does not directly protect the assets of foreign inves-
tors from their home governments, but it does reflect a fundamental
prejudice of our legal system. Although it is conceiveable that a court
might reject the limitation under certain circumstances for foreign policy
or other reasons, it cannot be confidently stated that a court so inclined
would be deterred by recourse to a trust.
V. Interruptions in Communications
A third situation which calls for protective planning is a political
emergency, natural catastrophe or personal crisis which, while not in-
volving a freeze or a seizure of assets, nonetheless interrupts or disrupts
communications between the investor and the United States. At least
from this side of the Atlantic, personal kidnapping, civil disturbances re-
sulting in an interruption of communications, or even war seem more
89 It is reported that the United States government did not vest the United States assets of
foreign corporations which transferred their corporate domicile out of enemy occupied territory
during World War II. Note, Corporations in Exile, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 364, 369-70 (1943). On
the other hand, courts have ignored the nominally neutral citizenship of aliens if they determine
that the alien's true loyalties belong to an enemy. See, e.g., Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v.
Clark, 82 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1949) (acquired Liechtenstein citizenship disregarded).
90 Shares of stock in a foreign corporation held by a nonresident alien are not property
situated within the United States and hence are not subject to the estate tax. I.R.C. §§ 2104(a),
2103. See Langer, Legal Structures Used in Internatonal Estate Planning, in CURRENT LEGAL As-
PECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING 204, 206 (1981).
91 See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
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likely perils for a West European investor than attempted confiscation of
their United States assets by their home governments. 92 It is difficult to
draft in advance a trust instrument which anticipates and effectively
deals with all of these contingencies.
VI. Power of Attorney
The situations which might require firm guidance and control to be
exercised from the United States over United States investments are
quite varied. A broad, durable power of attorney executed pursuant to
applicable state laws, 93 in favor of the investor's United States legal
counsel, seems to offer the greatest possible flexibility for dealing with
emergencies of this type. The instrument should grant the attorney-in-
fact the widest possible power to deal with the principal's property, so
that the attorney-in-fact would be fully empowered to do everything that
the principal could do if personally present, from voting shares, to exer-
cising power of office in a closely held corporation. Moreover, the attor-
ney-in-fact should have total discretion to act pursuant to these powers.
The instrument itself should have no internal reference to preconditions
and limitations to its use; these should be contained in a separate letter of
instructions to the attorney. Instructions, of course, are not self-execut-
ing, and contain no inherent safeguards against abuse. It may be cold
comfort, but at some point a foreign, nonresident investor must rely on
the professional and personal ethics of his counselors or trustees. Al-
though executed, the power of attorney should not be filed with a county
register of deeds until the attorney acting pursuant to the letter of in-
structions decides it is appropriate to exercise his powers under the in-
strument. The letter of instruction and even the power of attorney (prior
to filing) are privileged communications from a client to his attorney and
are safe from disclosure until used.
Once filed, the attorney can decide how best to act under the power
for the benefit of his client. If appropriate at that time, he may transfer
assets to a trust, 94 a holding company, or take other defensive action.
Best of all, in situations which might inappropriately trigger the auto-
matic emergency instructions of a trust, the attorney can exercise his dis-
cretion and decide not to act. For example, it has been reported that
when the Governor-General of Bermuda was assassinated in 1973, a
number of trusts fled the island under automatically triggered doomsday
provisions. 95 A competent attorney-in-fact acting under a power of at-
torney might not have acted so precipitously. If the Russian submarine
92 It should be noted that expropriation of assets accompanied by some consideration,
however adequate, is entirely possible. See Loyrette & Gaillot, The French Nationalizations: The
Decisions of the French Constitutional Council and Their Aftermath, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. 17
(1983). See also supra note 12.
93 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-1 (1983).
94 See Fred S James & Co., 247 N.Y. 262, 160 N.E. 364.
95 See Knight, supra note 3, at 9.
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that recently went aground in Sweden had instead been sailing near the
Netherlands Antilles, an even more precipitous flight of trusts and corpo-
rations can be imagined.
The legal effect of a power of attorney has been tested in the United
States courts under extreme conditions. Where the court was hostile to
the confiscating government and sympathetic to the efforts of the attor-
ney-in-fact to protect the United States assets for the benefit of United
States creditors and the pre-seizure owners, the use of the instrument was
vindicated.96 This was true despite the shaky legal theory which allowed
the attorney-in-fact to act on behalf of a corporation which had been
dissolved by the government of the state in which it was organized. In
Fred S James & Co. v. Rossia Insurance Co. ofAmerzca , 97 the court upheld the
creation of a Connecticut corporation by the attorney-in-fact for a corpo-
ration organized under the laws of the Russian Empire and dissolved by
the Bolsheviks. The Connecticut corporation received the United States
assets of the Russian corporation and issued stock to the attorney in trust
for the benefit of the old corporation's owners and United States credi-
tors. The New York Court of Appeals held that the exigencies of the
emergency justified and authorized the attorney's action. 98
In contrast, where the transfer was designed to avoid vesting by the
United States under the TWEA, the power of attorney was found to be
inadequate to effect the attempted transfer.9 9 A power of attorney thus
does not increase the protection already granted by the existing inclina-
tions and doctrines of United States courts, such as the territorial limita-
tion or the act of state doctrine. It does, however, add considerable
flexibilty to that protection.
A power of attorney avoids many problems inherent in the use of
offshore or domestic trusts: It does not commit the owner to a predeter-
mined and inflexible course of action; there can be no premature trigger-
ing of a power of attorney; and its use does not run the risk of adverse tax
consequences in either the United States or the trust situs.°00 Although
beyond the scope of this article, there can be substantial difficulties, par-
ticularly with regard to the Foreign Real Property Tax Act,' 0 ' in this
regard.
Many foreign investors seek United States visas in connection with
their investments. Elaborate planning is often necessary to secure per-
manent and even temporary visas. Given the current backlog in the
third and sixth preference categories for permanent visas, the investor
often must seek an L-l or E-2 nonimmigrant visa as an interim or even
96 See FredS.ames &Co., 247 N.Y. 262, 160 N.E. 364.
97 247 N.Y. 262, 160 N.E. 364.
98 Id. at 270, 160 N.E. at 367.
99 Kuname Fuimo, 71 F. Supp. at 4-5.
100 See Klein, supra note 7; Knight, supra note 3, at 10-12.
1l I.R.C. § 897 (Supp. V 1981). See generally P. POSTLEWAITE, INTERNATIONAL CORPO-
RATE TAXATION § 2.28 (Supp. 1984).
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alternative measure to a green card. The L-I visa allows qualified aliens
to transfer their employment temporarily from a foreign company to an
affiliated United States enterprise. 0 2 The E-2 visa is granted to citizens
of certain "treaty countries" who seek to enter the United States tempo-
rarily for the purpose of managing and directing a substantial invest-
ment in a United States enterprise.' 0 3
An important requirement for the L-1 visa is that the alien be em-
ployed in the United States by a branch, subsidiary or affiliated com-
pany of his employer abroad. The affiliation must be shown. If either
employer is an operating company which in turn is anonymously owned
by a tax haven trust, the alien will not qualify for the visa unless this
relationship is revealed to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) in order to prove that the United States operating company is affil-
iated with the foreign operating company. Some of the reasons which
led the alien investor to create the trust initially may well be defeated or
compromised by such disclosure. The problem is worse if the investor
seeks an E-2 treaty investor visa, because proof is required that the
United States investment which the investor manages and directs is
owned by the investor personally or by an entity which is a national of the
investor's country (assuming there is an appropriate treaty between the
investor's country and the United States). It can be assumed that the
trust will not be organized under the laws of the investor's home country,
and thus superficially will not be resident in that country. Therefore, at
a minimum the investor would have to reveal that he or she was the
settlor and beneficiary of the trust, and so was the beneficial owner of the
trust's assets.' 0 4 Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the INS would
accept this analysis of beneficial ownership and agree that the trust was
"owned" by a national of the treaty country. If it did not, and instead
ruled that the investment was owned by the trust, a resident of another
country entirely, the investor will not qualify for the E visa. These
problems do not arise where title to the assets remains with the foreign
investor and only the power to deal with the assets is transferred via the
power of attorney.
The power of attorney described in this article does not offer com-
plete protection for the United States assets of a foreign investor. More
elaborate protective mechanisms, however, do not offer any greater pro-
tection. The power of attorney, at least, gives the investor full flexibility
to take advantage of the public policy of the United States against en-
forcing foreign confiscation decrees against United States assets. Other
advantages include the elimination of the risk that third country
"havens" might prove unworthy of their name, and the avoidance of tax
102 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(L) (1982).
103 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(E) (1982). The E-2 visa can be a satisfactory permanent alterna-
tive to a green card since it will be renewed so long as the alien maintains his investment.
104 See 5 U.S. Dep't of State, Visa Services Bull. no. 20.
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problems which might result from transferring the legal title to United
States assets from one foreign entity to another. Most importantly, the
handling of the United States assets is left to the unencumbered judg-
ment of the investor's United States attorney, who is likely to be quite
familiar with these properties. In short, this relatively simple document
may provide far greater protection than a trust which is more expensive
to establish and maintain.
